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SUSTAINABILITY OF WATER AND SANITATION SYSTEMS
WHEN THE WORLD Bank financed BKS technical assist-
ance team arrived at the Water and Sewerage Authority
of Lesotho (WASA) in 1994 it was evident that the organi-
sation was facing three main obstacles to the sustainability
of the organisation:
• absence of a proper planning function;
• financial frailty; and
• limited institutional capacity.
This paper illustrates the problems, discusses how
solutions have been approached and the extent to which
strategies have been successful.
Lack of proper planning
The key task of the technical assistants is to develop a five
year capital programme for WASA from 1996/7 to 2000/
01.  This was problematic in WASA for several reasons;
lack of corporate policies, poor base data and little infor-
mation about beneficiaries.
First, it is clearly not possible to develop a plan for the
future if the goals management are seeking to achieve are
not explicit. In WASA there was no formal statement of
policies. The technical assistants initiated the process of
policy formulation by holding a series of seminars with
senior management, with departmental heads contribut-
ing policy proposals.
The process of formulating a policy document ad-
equate to submit to the Board of WASA took almost a
year. This was because a number of the management
team tended to view policy formulation as of secondary
importance to day-to-day operational management. There
is a real danger in this situation that technical assistants
write the policy document themselves and then submit it
to management for approval.
This leaves management with little ‘ownership’ of the
process.
Our experience has shown that the single most impor-
tant factor in developing a useful policy document is the
support of the Managing Director of the implementing
agency. Without this it is very difficult to involve staff at
all levels in the process of policy formulation.
A second problem faced in the investment planning
exercise was the very poor quality of base data. In WASA
the quality of financial data is good, but the most basic
operational data such as customer numbers and the
capacity of existing infrastructure was often only accu-
rate to within +/- 50%.A great deal of time was spent
collecting accurate base data for the investment planning
exercise and, whilst laborious, the creation of accurate
base data has proved to be one of the most valuable spin-
offs from the investment planning exercise.
The third, and related problem, was that WASA had no
information about either their existing, or potential, cus-
tomers.  As both these groups of people will be the
beneficiaries of any capital investment programme, it
was important understand who they are and their aspi-
rations.
Building up a data base on existing customers proved
relatively straightforward and inexpensive. A question-
naire seeking information on socio-economic variables,
perceptions of service quality and price was included
with the monthly bills, resulting in a response rate of
about 10%. This has generated invaluable planning data
such as unit service demands for different categories of
customer, willingness and ability to pay, and areas where
WASA performance is poor. This exercise also has useful
spin-offs.
For instance, by far the most common complaint from
customers was also the cheapest to remedy, namely
being informed in advance of interruptions in water
supply.
Data on potential future customers was collected by
hiring a local consultant to undertake a Beneficiary As-
sessment in a sample of peri-urban locations. This exer-
cise cost some M100 000 (US$3.67 = 1 Maloti as at June
1995)
Whilst very large sums have been spent on four master
planning exercises at WASA over the past five years, full
account has never been taken of the needs and aspira-
tions of beneficiaries. Master plans undertaken by  Euro-
pean consultancies have tended to perpetuate the con-
ventional approach of planning a very high level of
service (if direct house water connections, often with
reticulated sewerage) for a small minority of consumers
and no service for the majority.
The Beneficiary Assessment illustrated that this ap-
proach was not appropriate in Lesotho. What most peo-
ple want in the per-urban area is a clean, inexpensive and
close-by water source and a Ventilated Improved Pit
Latrine (VIP). Direct water and sewerage house connec-
tions cannot be afforded by most households, and in
some cases, are not even desired (if households living in
a single room will not generally want internal sanita-
tion).
This led to a radical shift in the philosophy underlying
the capital programme away from ‘everything for a few’
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chosen option, and only serve the more affluent minor-
ity.
Full sewerage reticulation would cost about
M2 000 per head, and attract few customers.
WASA is only at the point of piloting these solutions in
the per-urban areas. However, the principles of commu-
nity consultation, affordability and flexibility to upgrade
appear to contribute to a truly sustainable capital pro-
gramme.
Financial frailty
WASA’s financial performance has deteriorated  each
year the organisation has been in existence. This is de-
spite the clear financial requirements of the Order estab-
lishing WASA, that revenues have to fully recover all
costs.
In its first year the Authority returned a small gross
profit of  M0.2 million. However, in 1993/4 the Authority
made of loss of M0.8 million and in 1994/5 a loss of M2.1
million was reported on a turnover of M21 million. The
1995/6 budget anticipates an even bleaker future with a
projected deficit of some M3.5 million. The reasons for
this poor financial  performance are both external and
internal.
Externally, Government has shown a  reluctance to
approve tariff increases proposed by the Board of WASA.
Since the creation of WASA inflation has increased by
about 39%, yet tariffs have only been allowed to increase
by 4% - implying a real reduction in the value of the tariff
of about a third. Government has justified its refusal to
increase tariffs by highlighting  the inefficiencies within
WASA.
The deteriorating political situation facing the Govern-
ment was also a factor in reducing the enthusiasm for
raising prices for water supply and sanitation  services.
Internally, there have been very limited attempts to
improve operational efficiency in WASA. Within the
organisation the civil service culture persists with man-
agement seemingly unwilling to implement reforms to
raise productivity even when inefficiencies are obvious.
A tariff study was undertaken by the technical assist-
ants and it was found that the current average tariff of
M2.8 per m³ would have to be raised to about M4.2 per m³
in the short term to ensure financial viability.
The average tariff will have to be increased to about M5
(in 1995/6 prices) in the medium term to finance the
capital programme to the Year 2000. At the same time as
the tariff study  a series of workshops were held with
senior WASA management to identify and quantify po-
tential efficiency improvements within the Authority.
These efficiency findings have been taken account of in
the tariff analysis.
The technical assistants have sought to deal with the
issue of requiring significant tariff increases in two ways.
One has been to propose a three band tariff structure to
protect the poor with all ‘basic needs’ consumption
charged at the O&M tariff, all ‘normal’ domestic and all
Graph 1. Planned coverage levels
towards ‘something for everyone’. The coverage rate
targets, outlined in Graph 1, drive the capital programme.
Note that even with an acceleration in the rate of new
connections, the ‘conventional’ water delivery mecha-
nism of  direct house connections scarcely keep pace with
population growth. The number of people served by
public standpipes also declines as these are closed, in
response to Government late payment.
The need to develop  a universal, affordable and so-
cially acceptable alternative delivery mechanism took
WASA staff and technical assistants on a study tour in
Swaziland to see some pilot schemes in operation. The
pilot schemes involved two methods of community-
driven water delivery.
The water kiosk: a lockable structure with a commu-
nity nominated attendant. Five taps which, controlled
from inside the kiosk,  deliver water to the public. The
sale price of M0.10 per 20 litre container is split between
the attendant, the community council and the water
authority (with the latter receiving the equivalent of the
‘basic needs’ tariff).
Shared Water Points (SWP): these are essentially a
lockable standpipe. Up to 20 households in an area get
together and share the capital cost of  extending the
reticulation and building the SWP. After paying a de-
posit each household receives a key to the tap and pays
a flat charge of M5 per month, provided water consump-
tion is not excessive.
A very basic reticulated system with kiosks, and the
capacity to be upgraded to SWPs or house connections,
has a capital cost of about M0.6 million per km² (or M120
per capita). This will give everyone access to a water
kiosk as a minimum. Individuals and groups can then
upgrade to a shared water point and subsequently a
direct house connection in accordance with their own
means and aspirations. By way of contrast, a conven-
tional water reticulation system would have a capital
cost about 70% more  (M200 per capita) than WASA’s
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non-domestic consumption charged at full cost recov-
ery, and ‘excessive’ domestic water use charged at a level
sufficient to cross-subsidise the cost of ‘basic needs’
water use.
Second, the related issues of the need for a significant
tariff increase and efficiency improvements have been
brought together in the form of a Performance Contract
being developed between WASA and Government. Es-
sentially this specifies in detail the regulatory framework
within which WASA will operate over a five year period.
The basis for annual tariff reviews is being negotiated as
is the achievement of quantified corporate performance
indicators required by Government.
It is hoped that this will allow WASA to achieve
financial viability but also put pressure on management
to improve efficiency as the quid pro quo of tariff in-
creases. The fundamental challenge remains that ulti-
mately tariff and productivity reforms are decided by
politicians, not technocrats.
Institutional capacity
Whilst it has been relatively unproblematic to develop
with WASA an appropriate capital programme, the ex-
tent to which the technical assistants have contributed to
the capacity of the institution to be self-sustainable is
much more limited.
This is implicity recognised in the capital programme
planned for WASA from 1996/7 to 2000/01.
It has been estimated that, in order to implement the
M¼ billion programme, some M24 million will be re-
quired in institution building projects (see Graph 2).
The central institutional problem at WASA is one of
significant overstaffing in the Authority as a whole, but
a very low proportion of professional staff.  The total staff
complement of 585, implies a staff per 1000 connections
of about 29.
Notwithstanding the general overstaffing, only 19 staff
on WASA’s payroll (some 3%) have a degree-level quali-
fication, and only a further 6% have diplomas. This
means that the qualified and competent staff are often
overstretched. The response to this has been for donors to
finance, usually on a grant basis, technical assistants.
This has real short-term advantages both for donors and
the implementing agencies. Donors can be more assured
that specific pieces of work, such as  investment plans,
policy documents, etc will be produced to a satisfactory
standard in a timely manner. Technical assistant projects
also have the advantage to a bilateral donor that much of
the budget is likely to be spent in the country of origin
rather than destination.
The implementing agency also benefits  to the extent
that technical assistants essentially subsidise the payroll.
However, it could be argued that not only are technical
assistants without proper counterpart not a long-term
solution to the capacity building of institutions, but also
that they are part of the problem.
Graph 2. Components of WASA’s
five year capital programme
The Basotho people are amongst the best educated in
Africa and have a long history of seeking employment in
South Africa, which surrounds Lesotho. Wage levels in
South Africa are about 40% higher than those in Lesotho.
The reason that WASA requires technical assistants is
probably more a reflection of the uncompetitive remu-
neration for senior management in the Authority rather
than the absence of suitably qualified and experienced
Basotho professionals. There is a danger that technical
assistants may be an obstacle to developing the salary
structure which would facilitate the smaller, more highly
qualified and productive workforce required at WASA.
Lessons to be learned
1. A useful planning process requires the careful formu-
lation of goals and collection of reliable technical and
socii-economic data as a pre-condition. This may
result in very different conclusions about the best use
of scarce investment funds.
2. Given the current structure of the industry in Lesotho
it is not clear what are the appropriate  boundaries to
Government intervention in WASA. The perform-
ance contract may provide a useful formalisation of
this relationship, particularly if this places the annual
tariff review process in the hands of an independent
regulator and away from central government control.
The may obviate the need for a more fundamental
restructuring of the sector.
3. Technical assistants are not a long-term substitute for
qualified, motivated and competent local professional
management staff.
The authors wish to stress that this paper expresses their
personal views only and does not reflect the views of
BKS Incorporated Consulting Engineers, the World Bank,
the Water & Sewerage Authority or the Government of
Lesotho.
